INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM: A Philosophical Critique of Pope Benedict XVI and the Fall of Religious Absolutism more

INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM: A Philosophical Critique of Pope Benedict XVI and the Fall of Religious Absolutism Matthew S. Lopresti Introduction This paper does not concern itself with a dialogue between those who share, or think they share, a common vision of reality. Rather, the focus is on those who generally do not share a common vision of reality. By focusing on this second, more interesting, group we are presented with a challenging philosophical and practical problem in our examination of inter-religious dialogue, specifically, we are faced with the question: is it possible to hold an absolutist view of the truthfulness of one’s own traditions and still engage in an open inter-religious dialogue with other religions? The importance of this question cannot be overemphasized: and this paper is aimed at answering this question in as affirmative a way as possible, but with the ironic twist that absolutists who wish to engage in inter-religious dialogue must adopt a pluralistic outlook if they are to remain faithful to the unconditional1 truth-claims of their own tradition. This paper is dedicated to framing the question in a way that highlights the need for an agreed upon philosophical basis for this dialogue, and in so doing demonstrates the intimate connectivity of inter-religious dialogue with religious pluralism. This paper is divided into three main sections. This first defines what is meant by “inter-religious dialogue.” The second demonstrates the necessary relationship between religious pluralism and inter-religious dialogue: inter-religious dialogue is a practice that needs to be informed by the theory of religious pluralism, and religious pluralism is a theory that is strengthened and furthered by the practice of inter-religious dialogue. The third somewhat counter intuitively argues that if a tradition is committed to religious absolutism (and its practitioners are to remain faithful), then it (and they) must also be committed to genuine inter-religious dialogue and therefore, surprisingly, must also commit itself (and themselves) to a religious pluralism. Joseph Ratzinger’s2 writings on these issues lead to a more thorough understanding of the challenges and possibilities afforded to religious traditions in their struggle to strike a balance between commitments to authentic (rather than A religious absolutist holds that one’s religious tradition—especially its conception of a religious ultimate—is based on unconditional truth-claims. Because one’s tradition is thought to have uniquely true insights of ultimate reality, that tradition’s dogma, soteriological path, and spiritual praxes are understandably thought to teach and prescribe the only, if not perhaps the most, correct and efficacious religious beliefs and practices. Throughout this paper I will often use the name “Ratzinger” rather than “Pope Benedict XVI” because I do not want to be perceived as trying to undermine the Pope, per se, or Catholic dogma, but rather am analyzing and critiquing the philosophical ideas and implications of the man. At certain times, when it is appropriate to draw attention to his role as the head of the Roman Catholic Church, I may use his pontific name or title. 2 1 polemical) inter-religious dialogue and commitments to absolutist religious dogma. Attention to the interplay between views of religious pluralism and interfaith dialogue in his scholarship uncovers assumptions that may either preclude or foster the possibility for open and genuine inter-religious dialogue and pluralism itself. On Inter-religious Dialogue A. Theological Bases for Inter-religious Dialogue? Prescribing a shared vision of reality is hardly a popular thing to do when setting a groundwork for possible dialogue with traditions (religious or otherwise) quite different from one’s own. It is nevertheless necessary for any inter-religious dialogue to take place. If the prescribed vision of reality comes from or blatantly resembles some one religious tradition or another, adherents of different traditions will rightly feel excluded or violated and this may even turn potential participants in the dialogue off, or implicitly render the “dialogue” moot, because of an inability to begin the dialogue from a shared perspective (i.e., a perspective of non-superficial similarities and differences). If, on the other hand, this shared perspective is prescribed by a sensible, a-religious philosophical understanding of reality, then I argue that there is a better chance for inter-religious dialogue to get off the ground. But, such a dialogue is apt to seem vacuous and of little if any interest to those who are unwaveringly committed to truth and see a particular worldview as true, and even worse for those committed to an absolutist view of their particular metaphysical understanding of that worldview. These are the two possibilities of religious absolutism and I make this distinction here between a commitment to the objects or aims of greatest religious concern identified in one’s tradition as universal truths (e.g., the religious ultimates or salvific paths and aims) and a commitment to a way of seeing the world because later I will argue that if one is committed to the former, then, being committed to truth, one must also be committed to inter-religious dialogue.3 If one is committed to the later, however, then one ends up, in Abrahamic terms, worshipping his worldview instead of God.4 In essence this means that aligning oneself with dogma rather than the reality that this dogma is supposed to accurately portray. In certain traditions, for example, there is an obligation for adherents to actively seek out wisdom and understanding equal to their intellectual ability (e.g., Islam) and specific teachings geared towards people with different levels of insight and wisdom (e.g., Buddhism’s pragmatic notion of upāya, or skill-inmeans). Such understanding is not attained by abject surrender of the intellect to dogma but demands an active engagement in not only intra-religious dialogue but inter-religious dialogue as well so that one can more fully realize the deepest wisdom of the dharma, for Buddhists, or more fully and more faithfully surrender one’s soul unto Allah, in Islam. Taking a cue from T.S. Eliot, I argue that to be faithful to the claims of one’s tradition one must actively engage in an understanding of these claims, and just as one only knows oneself through engagement with the Other, one does not begin to understand one’s own religious tradition until one comes back to it (from an engagement with another tradition) for the first time. In non-theistic Buddhist terms, we could say that one ends up being attached to the teachings rather than embodying them. In secular Whiteheadian terms we might accurately say that one ends up fallaciously concretizing a conceptual scheme as foundational rather than adventuring with these fluid and largely pragmatic abstractions. 2 4 3 Dutch philosopher Louwrens W. Hessel5 argued at the conference that discussing the possibility for a shared vision of reality is a handicap for theologians who—if they are “good theologians”—are committed to a particular, and largely non-negotiable, vision of reality. This wrongly implies that theologians are equally committed to explicit metaphysical systems, but I contend that the metaphysics theologians often find themselves committed to are not so much necessary to their respective religions as they are inherited explanations of the dogma of those religions, expressed in terms of one rather than another metaphysical system (e.g., Roman Catholicism and Thomistic philosophy). I favor a thesis contra Hessel, namely that it is not possible for theologians to fully engage in inter-religious dialogue unless they are able and willing to temporarily bracket their theological and supposed metaphysical commitments and engage other traditions qua philosophers.6 In this sense, inter-religious dialogue is a philosophical, not a theological, activity and can also constitute a furthering of one’s religious practice. B. A Philosophical Basis for Inter-religious Dialogue Understanding inter-religious dialogue as a philosophical rather than theological activity means that there is no need to attempt to provide inter-religious theological bases for dialogues between traditions (especially given the total lack of theology in some major religious traditions). Getting parties to agree on a theological basis from which their dialogue can grow would require a specifically tailored basis for each dialogue that differs with each new tradition that engages in or disengages from the dialogue. As a philosophical activity, however, interreligious dialogue avoids this un-navigable minefield completely. Locating a philosophical basis for inter-religious dialogue means, in this paper, articulating a vision of reality that offers the most fertile ground for effective interreligious dialogue. I see that ground to be a deep religious pluralism and informed by the philosophy of Whitehead and Hartshorne, whose search for a general vision or understanding of the cosmos is grounded in a process perspective.7 It is this general In Interreligious Dialogue—by whom, for what purpose. How to Overcome the Clash of Religions. Presented at the conference on The Philosophical Basis for Inter-Religious Dialogue in Katowice, Poland (May 2008) and also appearing in this volume. 6 5 To be fair, Hessel argues that philosophers are required as mediators in inter-religious dialogue, but dismisses the possibility that theologians can themselves fully participate on their own. It seems that he and I agree insofar as we both see inter-religious dialogue as a philosophical rather than theological practice. The most recent and concise articulation of this pluralism can be found in David Ray Griffin, Deep Religious Pluralism (Louisville: Westminster John Know Press, 2005). John B. Cobb, Jr. originated the theory and it has been most thoroughly explicated and promulgated by David Ray Griffin. The basis of this religious pluralism is the ontological plurality of Alfred North Whitehead’s process metaphysics. Whitehead’s metaphysical schema involves three ontological ultimates as generic, irreducible aspects of the world. They are creativity, God, and actual occasions. Cobb takes these ontological ultimates as schemata for interpreting different multiple religious traditions—specifically their general conceptions of religious ultimates—as compossibly true. By arguing that there a plurality of religious ultimates can simultaneously obtain, Cobb establishes a “deep” religious pluralism wherein a plurality of religious traditions can be true 3 7 process perspective that I believe offers the most fertile ground for a cross-cultural, transtraditional shared vision of reality. Nevertheless, this paper limits its argument to showing only that a pluralistic perspective will have to be adopted by any who wish to engage in inter-religious dialogue. This pluralistic perspective need not, however, push us into the arms of a Whitehead-specific pluralism. In the end, however, I clearly see this as the most likely candidate for a stable philosophical basis for not only inter-religious dialogue but a deep religious pluralism as well. But if one sees absolutism and relativism as the only available options for attempting an explanation of religious diversity—and this is the mistake I argue that Joseph Ratzinger makes in the second section of this paper —then where is the basis for commitment to unconditional religious truths, let alone inter-religious dialogue? This brings us back to the idea that the purpose of inter-religious dialogue depends upon whether one adopts a relativist, pluralist, or absolutist outlook towards religious diversity. C. The Relative Purpose of Inter-religious Dialogue No tradition-respecting religious practitioner chooses relativism. Even if one did, what could be the point of dialogue from a relativistic perspective? To pass the time? It will be shown that Ratzinger feels compelled to choose absolutism, because he rejects relativism and sees no other alternative, having conflated pluralism with relativism. In Ratzinger’s hands, religious absolutism leads to confusing imperatives regarding inter-religious dialogue and along with his writings on the topic, makes his endorsement of inter-religious dialogue suspect. Having demonstrated how Ratzinger’s negative view of religious pluralism negatively effects8 his view of inter-religious dialogue, which he sees as a tool for conversion, we will then turn to a deeper examination of absolutism as a viable response to the diversity of religious traditions and their truth claims. Where does absolutism leave people committed to inter-religious dialogue and is there a role for genuine interreligious dialogue in a religious absolutism beyond what Ratzinger envisions? Pluralism calls for engagement in genuine inter-religious dialogue to further the depth of understanding of one’s own tradition and of the traditions of others on their own terms. Above all, it requires David Ray Griffin’s positive and negative criteria for a generic religious pluralism. The negative affirmation is the rejection of religious absolutism, which means rejecting the a priori assumption that [one’s] own religion is the only one that provides saving truths and values to its adherents, that it alone is divinely inspired, that it has been divinely established as the only legitimate religion, intended to replace all others. The positive affirmation, which goes beyond the negative one, is the acceptance of the idea that there are indeed religions at the same time. “Effect” because I am arguing that there is an implicit counterfactual relation between religious pluralism and inter-religious dialogue and vice versa. 4 8 other than one’s own that provide saving truths and values to their adherents.9 But absolutists are in no way inclined to accept these two pluralistic demands, because it may seem as if the “negative” demand requires one to reject one’s faith and the “positive” demand is a descent into relativism, if not blasphemy. Do these pluralistic criteria then exclude absolutism by mere fiat? Why ought an absolutist accept these criteria? As we shall see, Vatican II’s Nostra aetate might be interpreted as an attempt by Catholicism to grant both of these pluralistic assumptions. But without getting into intrareligious theological debate, suffice it to say that some, like Joseph Ratzinger and Marcello Pera, see Nostra aetate as espousing relativism. Instead can we locate a direct link between religious absolutism and Griffin’s pluralistic criteria? After demonstrating the necessary link between one’s view of inter-religious dialogue and one’s view of the viability of a religious pluralism in the second section, I argue in the third and final section of this paper that we can, because religious absolutism is argued to require genuine inter-religious dialogue, and since this dialogue requires a pluralistic basis for it to get off the ground, a viable religious absolutism would be paradoxically reliant upon these pluralist assumptions. Joseph Ratzinger, Inter-religious Dialogue, and Religious Pluralism In May 1996, Pope Benedict XVI, then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, identified the “theology of religious pluralism as the gravest threat facing the church today.”10 His reasoning behind this statement was two-fold: first he criticized religious pluralism for being what he calls a “religious indifferentism” (i.e., relativism)11, and second, he is gravely concerned with what he sees as religious pluralism’s challenge to the unique saving role of Christ.12 The concern for truth over indifferentism toward truth and the preservation of the basic tenets of one’s tradition are theological concerns that many of the world’s religious traditions and their practitioners share. These are issues that Ratzinger ought to be concerned about. I argue that as a philosopher, however, Joseph Ratzinger makes scholarly errors in his characterization of pluralistic theologies as relativisms. These errors have a dramatic and deleterious effect on his two concerns above and also on his 9 Griffin, Deep Religious Pluralism, 3. Reported by John L. Allen, Jr. in “Perils of Pluralism - History of Vatican opposition to relativism among world religions,” National Catholic Reporter, September 15, 2000. “Religious indifferentism” carries an epistemic meaning for Ratzinger. Anyone who adheres to religious indifferentism regards the truth of one religion to be equal with the truth of others, and so, for Ratzinger, his use of this term clearly denotes relativism. This phrase was also used by Ratzinger (when he was still the Prefect of the Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith) to criticize the work of Indian Jesuit Fr. Anthony de Mello, whom he accused of uncritically blending ideas from Eastern and Western traditions. This is the essential roadblock to Christian consideration of pluralism, and no faithful Christian can ignore it. Due to limited space, I am unable to address this issue here, though it is addressed in Chapter 5 of my dissertation, from which this paper is derived. 5 12 11 10 stated positions re inter-religious dialogue. There is a unique paradox in Ratzinger’s commitment to inter-religious dialogue in his actions as Pope and in his ostensible disdain for genuine dialogue in his worlds as a scholar. In his recent actions as pontiff, Ratzinger has clearly made gestures towards open dialogue with other traditions (Islam and Orthodox Christianity in particular), however, in his writings as Prefect for the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, I argue, he views inter-religious dialogue as a tool for evangelism, and thus sees no real role for open dialogue at all. This section of the paper is directed at an examination of the philosophical reasoning that informs Pope Benedict XVI’s views on religious pluralism and how this directly impacts his views on inter-religious dialogue. Ratzinger’s views discussed herein fit with most recent and well-known articulations of the Church’s hardened position on dialogue and pluralism. This should be expected, seeing as he was the Prefect of the Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith for a quarter of a century prior to becoming Pope.13 The Prefect’s job is to determine what is and what is not appropriate Catholic theology.14 One might defend Ratzinger by saying that it is not entirely fair to criticize a Pope, of all people, for “protecting the faith” or preserving the philosophical lineage of his tradition. Indeed, given his past role as Prefect and his new role as a Shepard, such unwavering and unapologetic protectionism ought to be expected in his theology. But my critique is neither theological nor personal, nor is it a critique of the Roman Catholic Church itself; rather it is a purely philosophical critique of the writings of the man who also happens to currently head it. Responses that point to Ratzinger’s role as prefect or pontiff rather than his reasoning are more defenses of the man rather than the positions he is taking. Similarly, responses that point to the larger context of Catholic doctrine rather than the arguments presented in his writings are more defenses of Catholicism than the positions this one man is taking. Either type of response will miss the point of my critique. Besides, if there is a Western religious tradition that has thrived from critical inquiry, it is the Roman Catholic Church and this sort of philosophical analysis of Ratzigner’s views is certainly warranted and worth undertaking. What follows is the first English language philosophical critique of Pope Benedict XVI’s writings. It begins by arguing that he reduces all religious Ratzinger was Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith from 1981 until the time he was elected Pope in 2005 and he was Cardinal and Archbishop of Munich and Freising for five years prior to that (1977- 1982). Rather than focus on how Roman Catholics have historically addressed pluralism and how exactly the current pontiff fits in here, it is sufficient in this article to note the kind of attention that has been paid to Roman Catholic clergy and academics who have addressed the challenge of pluralism since Vatican II. The fallout of Ratzinger’s attention in this area has lead to a number of censured works (some posthumously), a list of theologians deemed to be either unfit to teach Catholic Theology, and, in some instances, has resulted in excommunication for what seems to have been the crime of taking Vatican II a little too seriously, a little too soon. Even Pope John-Paul II found himself and his ecumenical outreach the object of CDF corrections. 6 14 13 pluralisms to relativism. As a result, it is more than understandable that he deeply distrusts pluralism. I argue, however, that his wholesale reduction of pluralism to relativism is related to his narrow conception of the possible utility of interreligious dialogue. Ratzinger’s writings are critiqued to demonstrate that, for him, inter-religious dialogue is desirable only to the extent that it offers an opportunity to convert others to Catholicism. I argue, to the contrary, that genuine inter-religious dialogue must be concomitant with an authentic and demonstrably deep religious pluralism, and is thereby exclusive of any intentional attempts at conversion. A. Misunderstanding Pluralism: A Note on Taxonomy Religious pluralism calls for a normative philosophical response to the fact of religious diversity. Paying attention to the ism we ought to be sure to distinguish it from the basic descriptive fact of religious diversity as well as from more generic pluralistic theologies. Pluralism, as a philosophical response to religious diversity, must also be distinguished from the cosmopolitan and democratic ideals of tolerance and acceptance of this multiplicity of religious traditions. Tolerance of plurality is not pluralism; neither is diversity itself pluralism. A religious pluralism is a hypothesis that claims the truthfulness of multiple seemingly contradictory religious traditions (or aspects of various traditions) can simultaneously obtain without contradiction. Relativism, which is pluralistic in its intent, is the far more radical claim that “all traditions are equally true” (and therefore equally false). So whereas pluralism is not necessarily committed to embracing all religious traditions, relativism declares all religious traditions to be right, just not in a meaningful way. Harder, absolutist responses include: exclusivism, inclusivism, and identism.15 Ratzinger does not address these three harder responses to religious diversity and so we will part from further explication of them here. In order to demonstrate that pluralism does not pose a relativistic threat to Christianity, as Ratzinger seems to think it does,16 it is worthwhile at this point to also Exclusivism claims that one’s own tradition is the only veridical one, to the exclusion of others. Inclusivism allows for the truthfulness of other traditions (or aspects of some traditions) to be explained by means of determining the extent to which they approximately express the truths of one’s own tradition. Identism, which Griffin identifies as John Hick’s position, is a bit more complicated. While it is more pluralistic than inclusivism it is not quite a pluralism. This is because identism is more closely aligned with inclusivism than pluralism insofar as it purports to ascertain the truthfulness of other traditions (or aspects of some traditions) by means of determining the extent to which they participate in a generic view of reality that just happens to resemble one type of tradition to the exclusion of others. Identism, therefore, attempts to cast a wider inclusivist net by trying to explain wildly divergent religious traditions in generic terms that are utterly foreign to some and intimately familiar to others. The most profound error of identism is the claim that there is just one transcendent religious ultimate. Regardless of how much Hick, and identists in his vein, claim that no single quality can rightfully be said to characterize this religious ultimate to the exclusion of others (e.g., personal or impersonal), one thing is for certain in Hick’s Kantian characterization of the religious ultimate, it is explicitly noumenal, transcendent. A transcendent ultimate reality is a concept that is utterly foreign to several major world religions (e.g., the religious ultimates of Daoism and Buddhism, among others, are radically immanent) and therefore, an identism, which has pluralistic intent, ironically denies these traditions an explanation of themselves in their own terms in an absolutist manner that resembles an inclusivism more than it does a pluralism. 16 15 To be fair, Ratzinger does admit to there being different varieties of pluralism, but not once has 7 recap the basic distinctions between pluralism and relativism prior to arguing against Ratzinger’s conflation of the two. In its most generic form religious pluralism is distinguished, according to Griffin, by an adherence to two basic assumptions – one negative, the other positive (quoted previously). From these two assumptions alone, a number of different responses to religious diversity can occur – even relativism. Indeed, these two assumptions are what give a family resemblance to pluralistic theologies in general, but it is what they do with these assumptions that determines whether or not their pluralistic response forms an identism, a pluralism, or a relativism. The distinction for us here is that whereas religious relativism lacks any epistemic standard for the determination of a tradition’s truth claims, and is thus rightly rejected by Ratzinger as religious indifferentism, religious pluralism allows for standards for endorsing or denying various traditions, or aspects of those traditions, as veridical. The minimum standard that separates pluralism from relativism is pluralism’s basic adherence to the law of non-contradiction. Any pluralism should, therefore, be logically distinct from the kind of “debilitating relativism” identified by Alan Race, which takes all religions as equally true, and therefore as equally false.17 B. Absolutist or Relativist Soteriologies: A False Dichotomy Prior to becoming Pope Benedict XVI, Joseph Ratzinger co-authored a book with Marcello Pera (President of the Italian Senate), Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam.18 In it Pera observes: At Vatican II, in the declaration Nostra aetate (1965), the thesis was approved according to which the different religions ‘often reflect a ray of Truth which enlightens all men’ (article 2). While it recalls the principle that Christ is ‘the way, the truth, and the life,’ …[Pera protests that this declaration did not specify] that He is the only way. The orientation… seemed to allude to parallel roads to salvation…thus running the risk of relativism.19 he explicated anything other than a relativist or an identist position in his scholarship, at times even conflating the two. For Race’s statement of the challenge of avoiding a debilitating relativism for any pluralistic theologies see Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1982), 78. Joseph Ratzinger and Marcello Pera, Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam, Trans. George Weigel (New York: Basic Books, 2006). Published in 2006, prior to his Papacy, Ratzinger and Pera support and endorse one another’s views on a number of issues involving modern societies’ response to the Church and the Church’s response to modern challenges. In it they both deride interreligious dialogue and religious pluralism. 19 18 17 Pera in Without Roots, 144 n. 31. 8 Twenty-five years later, the Church issued the encyclical Redemptoris missio (1990), in which the first chapter is entitled “Jesus Christ is the only Savior” and warns against “widespread indifferentism…characterized by a religious relativism which leads to the belief that ‘one religion is as good as another’” (article 36). A full decade later, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, took this “correction” even further in Dominus Iesus (2000)20, which declared “that the other [Christian] churches and other religions…were in a ‘gravely deficient situation.’”21 Ratzinger’s commitment to religious absolutism is made clear here in no uncertain terms. To be sure, I regret—as should other pluralists—the fact that persons, of whatever faith, hold any sort of simplistic indifferentism as alluded to by Ratzinger. Moreover, let me be absolutely clear in my agreement with Ratzinger that it is philosophically untenable for anyone to adhere to relativistic beliefs or a view that would simply equate one religion or salvation to be as good as another. This is, after all, an elementary and widely agreed upon truth dictated by the basic tenets of logic: the competing truth claims of the myriad religious traditions cannot all be true, and thus, pragmatically speaking, cannot sensibly be said to be of equal worth, so long as it is assumed that at least one is more factually true or efficacious than the others. Sadly, Ratzinger’s philosophical analysis and complete rejection of the varieties of religious pluralism, which we will come to momentarily, effectively throw the baby out with the bathwater22 since he mistakenly views all pluralistic theologies as various forms of logically untenable relativistic positions. While relativism is clearly an undesirable position, it is vital to point out at this point that I am not making any value judgment or assumption about absolutism being somehow inherently bad. While no prejudice should be held against absolutism, in the end, I will argue that it is not a tenable position. Indeed, the major world religious traditions generally conceive of themselves as being absolutely true, so I am also not singling out Catholicism (or Christianity for that matter) as absolutist. My point in critiquing absolutism via one particular thinker (Ratzinger) from one particular tradition (Catholicism) is simply to demonstrate that absolutist practitioners will find themselves in a paradox when they insist that their tradition presents absolute truths and simultaneously assume that inter-religious dialogue is desirable or are required by the tenets of their faith to participate in such dialogue. Paul Elie, called the wording of Dominus Iesus a “graceless” approach that used “wounding words.” “The Year of Two Popes: How Joseph Ratzinger stepped into the shoes of John Paul II – and what it means for the Catholic Church,” The Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2006. Vol. 297, No. 1., 64-92, page 76. 21 20 Ibid. The bathwater, of course, being pluralistic religious sentiments (some of which admittedly tend towards relativistic theologies) and which Ratzinger identifies as heretical, and the baby being authentic religious pluralism, which I identify as a perspective that is capable of being faithful to his and to other religious traditions. 9 22 C. “Pluralistic Indifferentism”: Conflating Religious Pluralism with Relativism Despite the clear differences between relativism and pluralism Ratzinger is quite fond of reducing pluralism to what he sees as a modern Hickian relativism,23 which reduces Christianity, as Ernst Troeltsch suggested, to a revelatory tradition that simply shows the side of God’s face that just happens to be facing the Europeans. Ratzinger also sees this “pluralism” as nothing particularly new – locating other times in history when Christianity had to face down the specter of religious relativism. He writes, for example, of the oration of the late fourth century Roman senator Symmachus (d. 402) who spoke before Emperor Valentinian II, “in defense of paganism and advocating the restoration of the statue of the goddess ‘Victoria’ in the Roman senate.”24 It is Symmachus whom Ratzinger considers to offer the classical formulation of “religious pluralism:” It is the same thing that we all worship; we all think the same; we look up to the same stars; there is one sky above us, one world around us; what difference does it make with what kind of method the individual seeks the truth? We cannot all follow the same path to reach so great a mystery.25 Given our taxonomy, however, we see this more clearly as a religious relativism rather than a pluralism, because it conflates religious ultimates and thought while disregarding method entirely. I call this strain of poor philosophical reasoning that hastily blends various pluralistic theologies into relativism, “pluralistic indifferentism”—contra Ratzinger’s “religious indifferentism.” Indeed, according to Ratzinger, the contemporary trend towards relativising religious truths, is merely a return to the theory of religion of late antiquity, specifically, as reflected in the dialogue Octavius, by Minicius Felix (circa 200 C.E.) and Varro’s theory of religion.26 Even so, Ratzinger is fond of lamenting what he sees as the particularly modern relativist indignation, which regards any statements that Catholicism is true and correct as imperialistic.27 Furthermore, he complains that “to claim to know See Joseph Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions, Trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 117-122 for his most specific identification of Hick’s theory as a relativism. 24 23 Ibid. 176. Ibid. Ratzinger quoted this from Gnilka, Chresis. In his footnote, Benedict notes further “[o]n pp. 19-26, Gnilka offers a detailed analysis of the text.” 26 25 See Ibid. 74 and 176. 27 Interestingly, Ratzinger also protests that pluralism “denies the unity of mankind” (Ibid. 81). However, it really reinforces the commonality of humanity as spiritual beings, but what it specifically does deny—at least Cobb’s pluralism does this—is the unity of religion. It does this by upholding difference in doctrines and paths which are understood to be cultivated as particular responses to particular challenges facing the human condition, and which direct us towards certain goals in light of these (often different or differently characterized) challenges. 10 the truth” these days is to be attacked as an arrogant threat to tolerance and freedom.28 Ratzinger and I can agree, however, that “The cost of countering absolutism by relativising truth and goodness is too high,” as Maria Baghramian writes in her book, Relativism,29 however, the perceived arrogance Ratzinger objects to is not due to any proclamation that Christianity represents a correct view, but rather, because he arrogates truth in its entirety for the Catholic faith—proclaiming it to be a complete truth, and therefore also the only truth.30 Just as Ratzinger is rightfully indignant of relativism as a reactionary position to absolutism, his reassertion of an unwavering absolutism (in response to what is largely layperson’s relativist tendencies) in an increasingly pluralistic world understandably draws ire. I contend that the indignation that has met the new Pope’s old scholarship is not a response by religious practitioners of other traditions who feel the same way about their own traditions as absolutely true. Instead, it is reflective of a growing pluralistic sentiment (as described in its generic form by Griffin’s two pluralistic assumptions above) that seeks to allow for a multiplicity of truths that may originate from a multiplicity of religious traditions. What is desperately needed for spiritual people of the world to move beyond sentimentality, however, is a positive, non-sentimental, nonrelativistic theory like the deep religious pluralism argued for by Cobb; what is needed in addition to that is a negative, non-sentimental, formal argument against absolutism to justify one in making the move from one view (absolutist) to the other (pluralist). Prior to presenting this negative argument, we turn to an explication of Ratzinger’s view of inter-religious dialogue in order to demonstrate the negative effect that his view of “pluralism” has on what he sees as the possibility for open and genuine dialogue from an absolutist perspective. D. Ratzinger’s Evangelical View of Inter-religious Dialogue In Ratzigner’s most recently translated book, Without Roots, Marcello Pera voices his and Ratzinger’s concern regarding inter-religious dialogue by posing two important questions: “what is the purpose of this dialogue; and what is its subject?”31 Regarding its purpose, he argues that it cannot be to discover truth, because revelation plays that role for Christianity. And though he admits that dialogue can lead to truth in areas other than 28 Ibid. 114. Maria Baghramian, Relativism (New York: Routledge, 2004), 304. Hence the importance of developing a coherent pluralism (or pluralisms) in response to religious, metaphysical, ontological, moral, and aesthetic absolutisms and relativisms. Thus, the pluralism endorsed herein can be seen as a part of a much larger pluralistic project across the philosophical spectrum. In fairness to the Catholic Church, Vatican II reintroduced the Augustinian notion (from The City of God) of a “pilgrim church” (ecclesia peregrima). In effect this can be understood as meaning that there are still truths to be discovered beyond Catholic dogma. It does not seem a stretch to suggest that some of these truths may be found in other religions. And since other truths are presumed, the faithful are obliged to seek them out, and therefore, I argue, obliged to engage in genuine inter-religious dialogue. 31 30 29 Pera in Without Roots, 28. 11 the Christian religion, he sees no point in Christians engaging in dialogue to learn any of these truths from other religious traditions. Pera, at least, is thus willfully blind to even the possibility that, although these other traditions may have very different worldviews and salvific goals, this does not imply that they wholly lack salvific knowledge or are mutually exclusive. Pera and Ratzinger thus seem to wholeheartedly endorse David Hume’s famous declaration that whatever is different in religion is contrary. Indeed, Pera does not even consider it worth examining the fact that many of the truths of other religions are acquired via revelation as well, and that perhaps a dialogue about these revelations might be fruitful for Christians and non-Christians alike. Ratzinger does not seem to recognize the complementary possibilities of different religious traditions and thus his view of the potential purpose of inter-religious dialogue is corrupted by this misinformed view. As an absolutist, it is not easy to see any other purpose to dialogue other than convincing another of the truth of one’s own tradition. Naturally, then, he is fearful that a lay Christian’s open engagement (i.e., an engagement wherein participants honestly open themselves and their traditions to critical inquiry from other traditions) in inter-religious dialogue could jeopardize her commitment to the attainment of salvation through Jesus Christ. Because of this dual aversion to genuine inter-religious dialogue it is no surprise that Ratzinger promulgates the use of dialogue as an evangelical tool. 1. Evangelical Tool or Relativist Credo? Pera’s sentiments (just above) and his view that inter-religious dialogue can have only two purposes: “to foster mutual understanding; and to preach”32 are echoed by Ratzinger later in the text when writing on multiculturalism. Ratzinger notes that multiculturalism would be unable to survive without an acknowledgement of some “common foundations.”33 This is a basic hermeneutic fact, so what is of interest here is what Ratzinger takes these common foundations to be. In a presentation of his views on this topic,34 he was very clear about this commonality being the “unity of the human condition”35 and this is presumably his meaning here as well. In talking of dialogue between people of different cultures and faiths, he says of this unity of the human condition, that it is: not estranged from the sacred…. [for multiculturalism] teaches us to approach the sacred things of others with respect…. We can and we must learn from that which is sacred to others. [Because w]ith regard to others, it is our duty to… show the face of the revealed God … the God who is so human that He 32 Ibid. Ratzinger in Without Roots, 79. In Salzburg, Austria during the Salzburg Higher Education week 1992. Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 79. 12 33 34 35 Himself became man.36 Saying that it is the Christian’s duty in inter-religious dialogue to “show the face of the revealed God” (i.e., Christ) seems appropriate and harmless on its own. But the reason for engaging in inter-religious dialogue at all, he says above, is to learn what others count as sacred, because it is “our duty” to correct them by showing them “the face of the revealed God.” Thus, we can see that what Ratzinger is saying, within the context of this plausible interpretation is that we ought to learn about others so as to better evangelize them. This meaning is validly inferred from what he writes. The encyclical Redemptoris missio states that “[i]nter-religious dialogue is part of the Church’s evangelizing mission” (article 55), and where the normative statement is written in this mission that “dialogue does not dispense from evangelization”, it seems quite clear that this intends the opposite to be true, namely, that evangelization ought to dispense from dialogue. Besides, Ratzinger makes it very clear that he understands that the concept of dialogue… has become the very epitome of the relativist credo.... [D]ialogue in the relativist sense means setting one’s own position or belief on the same level with what the other person believes, ascribing to it, on principle, no more of the truth than to the position of the other person. Only if my fundamental presupposition is that the other person may be just as much in the right as I am, or even more so, can any dialogue take place at all…. [As a result] the relativist elimination of Christology, and most certainly of ecclesiology, now becomes a central commandment of religion.37 It is no surprise from conclusions about the purpose of inter-religious dialogue such as this that Ratzinger has no qualms about utilizing inter-religious dialogue as an evangelizing tool in today’s world. The sad implication of is that both Ratzinger and Pera seem to see only two purposes of inter-religious dialogue—at least insofar as the Christian ought to be concerned: first, to work towards mutual understanding, and second, to use that gained understanding to effectively exploit the vulnerability of the other’s honest and open engagement so as to undermine her faith in her own tradition. Unfortunately, for people seduced by this view, nothing that could truthfully be counted as understanding of the Other could ever be attained in this so-called “dialogue” of conversion. The mere intent of employing inter-religious dialogue as a subversion tactic would prohibit any genuine understanding from the outset. In short, subterfuge would necessarily exclude the possibility of inter-religious dialogue.38 36 Ratzinger in Without Roots, 79. Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 120-121. 37 This is not to say that any communication involving deceit is somehow meaningless or not worthwhile, otherwise, areas like diplomacy, for example, would amount to nothing more than futile murmurings. Rather, it simple means that genuine dialogue, no matter what the topic of discussion, requires 13 38 2. Pluralistic Evangelism? To be sure, genuine inter-religious dialogue is not, and should not be, polemical. Neither does it merely serve those who seek greater understanding of the Other, because it ultimately brings greater clarity of one’s own position. It is no less than an open-ended discussion that ought to be transformative in this way for all its participants. I am in agreement with Cobb and Griffin, who understand genuine inter-religious dialogue as necessarily leading to mutual transformation.39 I agree with this and argue further that such an understanding does more than just foster greater understanding of the valuable common ground between religious traditions, it brings their unique differences into greater focus as well. A deeper appreciation of many traditions promotes an understanding of the possibility that different traditions can make separate but veridical claims about ostensibly contrary notions of reality and salvation such that epistemic dissonance does not arise. Ratzinger’s ostensible assumption that religious truth-claims are, by definition, mutually exclusive can thus be undermined by a more thorough understanding of the myriad traditions themselves, each from its own vantage point. This kind of understanding is an essential foundation component of any religious pluralism, and it is also informs Cobb and Griffin’s Whiteheadian religious pluralism. If the fruit of genuine inter-religious dialogue is to be “mutually transformative”, any transformation, from the Pope’s perspective, may very well be seen as threatening. Such transformations could be seen as furthering the project of pluralism and thereby the very nature of genuine inter-religious dialogue appears to be an evangelical ruse for promoting pluralism! Indeed, Ratzinger suggests that this is the case when he declares that dialogue means “the relativist elimination of Christology.”40 This would understandably deepen Ratzinger’s mistrust of such dialogue and further his disdain for “religious pluralism” – giving yet another perspective for understanding his view that inter-religious dialogue should not be used for anything other than conversion. Ratzinger’s opportunistic view of inter-religious dialogue is thus, I argue, an understandably defensive result of his view of its purpose and its effect. Even so, it is still excessive and reactionary. After all, what could such a man feel he has to gain from dialogue with, in his own words, the deluded adherents of “second-hand religion”41 who are in a “gravely deficient situation” (Dominus Iesus, 2000) when it comes to spirituality and religion and who, he fears, may be using inter-religious dialogue themselves a mutual openness and receptivity for all participating parties. For example, see John B. Cobb, Jr., Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982). Griffin endorses Cobb’s views in, among other places, Deep Religious Pluralism. 40 39 Ratzinger, Truth or Tolerance, 120-121. One of the most depressing remarks made publicly by Ratzinger was his regard for non-theistic religions as being, at best, “second-hand religion.” The implication of his view therefore seems to be that a Catholic ought not go slumming by engaging in inter-religious dialogue with degenerate religions. 14 41 (intentionally or not) to weaken a Christian’s chances at salvation through Christ? To see genuine inter-religious dialogue as an evangelical practice that works to convert people to pluralism is to assume both that a transformation of one’s understanding of one’s own tradition is somehow anathema to one’s own tradition, and that an appreciation of the claims of other traditions somehow relativizes one’s own. But this is not at all the case in a genuine inter-religious dialogue. Instead, the focus is on the positive influx of new perspectives, while, according to Cobb, affirming one’s own “as universally valid! What we cannot do, without lapsing back into unjustified arrogance, is to deny that the insights of other traditions are also universally valid.”42 The point is to recognize truth in other traditions, not to abandon the truth in one’s own. E. Genuine Inter-religious Dialogue My understanding of mutual transformation is perhaps more broadly construed than Cobb or Griffin’s. It does not necessarily require that one’s beliefs be altered or that one disassociate oneself from one’s inherited dogma. These may in fact occur, but at minimum transformation means enriched by contact. Transformation thus occurs as a result of any hermeneutic activity, but this does not mean abandoning one’s own position, but seeing some of its gaps and places for it to grow. We are unavoidably (and sometimes uninterestingly) changed by the activity of dialogue; amending our loyalties to particular ideas or themes is not a necessary aim. Rather, the aim is to transform one’s views of one’s own tradition and that of others simply by engaging in inter-religious dialogue with traditions other than one’s own. At minimum, an understanding of one’s own tradition is effectively altered insofar as it is now understood in the greater context of alternative views. This transformation is mutual for all involved in the dialogue and is why I do not say that this dialogue must be potentially transformative, but rather that it is transformative. This is neither a platitudinous nor a vacuous aim. At one level, this transformation is an unavoidable result of dialogue; to say, then, that the aim of dialogue is transformation is admittedly to say, in effect, that the purpose of dialogue is dialogue. This is true. But the secondary benefit of getting people talking across traditions in an open and receptive way is that the more this occurs, the more focus and attention will be directed to the need for commensurable common ground between people across traditions in order for this dialogue to even take place or have meaning. If, a dialogue between divergent traditions is ever going to get off the ground, the common ground they must meet on needs to be philosophical rather than theological. Furthermore, if there is to be any edifying purpose to this dialogue for its participants, the impetus of dialogue must be an assumed pluralistic, rather than absolutist or relativist, perspective. What Ratzinger fails to realize in his reduction of pluralism to relativism and his reduction of dialogue to a “relativist credo” is that the assumed equality of the other’s tradition and one’s own is merely the necessary starting point for a conversation involving the extremely sensitive subject matter of religious belief. When it comes to inter-religious dialogue, such assumed possible equality is absolutely necessary for any John B. Cobb, Jr., Transforming Christianity and the World: A Way beyond Absolutism and Relativism (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), 137. 15 42 conversation aiming at mutual understanding from each other’s perspective to even get off the ground. What counts as genuine inter-religious dialogue requires mutual openness and some degree of understanding from the outset, but it certainly does not involve conversion or even actual equality as a goal or even as a necessary by-product. The pluralist’s presupposition of one tradition being as truthful as another for the purposes of inter-religious dialogue is nothing more than a launch pad for dialogue to take place. But it is just that, a starting point; it is not an underlying philosophical assumption that must be unquestioningly held. Therefore, genuine inter-religious dialogue does not insist on a relativism that surrenders the meaningfulness of the central components of one’s tradition. This helps to help expose Ratzinger’s leap from before from “[o]nly if my fundamental presupposition is that the other person may be just as much in the right as I am, or even more so, can any dialogue take place at all,” to the notion that this necessitates “the relativist elimination of Christology.”43 There is absolutely no need to permanently “relativize our beliefs” in order to engage in dialogue.44 Explaining Cobb’s position further, Griffin writes, “he must provisionally bracket his tradition’s claims to what he, as a Christian, sees as most important is truly the most important thing.”45 Even so, Cobb does not claim that what is bracketed is: the content of what I find supremely important… nor the conviction that this is important for all, but only the opinion that it is more important for all than what others regard as supremely important. Perhaps becoming empty is just as important!46 The fact of the matter is that there are significant spiritual truths that are attainable through a variety of religious traditions, but if one does not recognize that this is even possible, then it seems that there will be nothing of value that a dogmatist or absolutist will immediately see in dialogue aside from conversion. F. Generic Pluralistic Assumptions as the Hermeneutical Basis for Genuine Interreligious Dialogue Griffin’s two generically pluralistic assumptions are absolutely necessary for genuine inter-religious dialogue to take place, because one must first negatively assume that you or your tradition does not have the only legitimate view, and second, you must positively assume that the Other may have a familiarity with a saving truth that you lack. In the first case, people who are committed to even absolutist views are obviously not 43 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 120-121. Cobb, Transforming Christianity and the World, 137. Griffin, Deep Religious Pluralism, 63. 44 45 John B. Cobb, Jr. in Leonard Swidler, et al., Death or Dialogue? From the Age of Monologue to the Age of Dialogue (London: SCM Press, 1990), 11. 16 46 incapable of thinking philosophically and therefore they are not incapable of engaging in inter-religious dialogue; even though their positions are informed by their native theologies, they can have the humility to break beyond these dogmatic limitations and imagine the negative pluralistic possibility necessary for engaging in inter-religious dialogue. Moreover, in the second, positive pluralistic possibility they can also have the fortitude to either expose themselves to critical inquiry or make themselves receptive to the spiritual insights of others. For the discerning participant in this dialogue, the hermeneutical basis provided by these two pluralistic assumptions may be too soft, too vague for any meaningful transformation to occur. It seems that with these assumptions alone, we are left wanting a more robust ground on which divergent traditions can to meet, but it is clear that these assumptions are a necessary doorway to that ground. G. Whitehead’s Metaphysical Pluralism as a Philosophical Basis for Genuine Inter-religious Dialogue While Griffin’s positive and negative assumptions are dialogical necessities, they are insufficient as a robust philosophical basis for this dialogue. How then might they lead us to a more robust philosophical basis for genuine inter-religious dialogue? For starters, they leave open a wide range of philosophical possibilities wherein these two assumptions might make sense. In my dissertation research I argue that our choices are limited to only generically pluralistic theologies as the meta-philosophical perspectives that can make broader sense of these two assumptions: identism, pluralism, and relativism. Neither relativist nor identist positions, however, offer viable explanations of religious diversity. This leaves us with only one remaining option to provide the philosophical basis for meaningful inter-religious dialogue, namely authentic religious pluralism. A process philosophical system adequately informs an authentic religious pluralism because it allows for an explanation of multiple religious ultimates.47 While other philosophical systems might be able to adequately inform an authentic pluralism, the Whiteheadian-based process philosophy employed by Cobb and Griffin is (currently) the only fully articulated process system that adequately satisfies the explanatory scope that an authentic religious pluralism aspires to. That is to say, it answers the philosophical challenges presented by religious diversity with the deepest, broadest, sensible explanation with the greatest simplicity; other schemata may very well invite authentic pluralisms, but they have yet to be fleshed out as a basis for a genuine religious pluralism to the same extent as the schemata of Cobb’s Deep Religious Pluralism. A Whiteheadian process view of reality, therefore, functions as the metaphysical and philosophical basis (that informs the hermeneutical basis) for this inter-religious dialogue, because it offers a philosophical narrative for making sense of the pluralistic assumptions required for inter-religious dialogue to take place. Without a shared view of reality that makes sense of these positive and negative pluralistic assumptions, any attempt at inter-religious dialogue would falter into relativism or be co-opted by one The multiple religious ultimates of creativity, God, and actual occasions serve as the basis of Cobb’s Deep Religious Pluralism. See footnote 7. 17 47 tradition’s religious interpretation of reality over another. Religious Pluralism is the Necessary Ground for Religious Absolutisms in Dialogue Much ink has been spilt over and against relativism. Similarly, whether pluralism can possibly provide a viable basis for a theology of religions has been subjected to much debate. But what about religious absolutism? Is it a viable position? In this final section I argue that strict religious absolutism is untenable.48 In critiquing the epistemic implications of committing oneself to absolute truth claims, I argue that inter-religious dialogue becomes necessary for faithful adherents of the world’s absolutist religions. This is largely because fidelity to the idea of absolute truth forces one towards a more pluralistic openness to the potentially transformative wisdom of the interpretive claims of other religious traditions. The problem with absolutism is largely an epistemic one. If there are absolute truths, then knowledge of these truths cannot be absolute.49 Santiago Sia more clearly articulated this position at the conference. In his paper from the conference he writes: In reply to a question by Matthew Lopresti… I explained that an important consideration in inter-religious dialogue is really an epistemological issue: how one understands and accepts the status of religious belief. In process philosophy, a distinction is made between absolute truths and our relative knowledge of such truths. Unlike relativism, process thought accepts that there are indeed absolute truths; but unlike absolutism, it rejects the absoluteness of our knowledge of such truths. Furthermore, the certainty with which one holds one’s beliefs does not justify the absoluteness of those truths.50 Rather, the certainty with which one holds one’s beliefs undermines the absoluteness of the realities that these beliefs purport to be about. This is clearly an idea that we share, and it is the essential idea that informs the argument I made against religious absolutism during my conference paper. The profound power and simplicity of the pluralistic turn lies in the change of the article the to a, as in, “my tradition is the true religion” to “my tradition is a true religion.” The first and necessary step in achieving this article shift is the I am extremely grateful to Amy Donahue for her assistance in the development of this argument, as well as for both her and Ben Lukey’s insightful comments and suggestions during my writing of this paper. I thank Santiago Sia for more precisely articulating this aspect of my argument against absolutism during question and answer after his presentation and in his gracious comments after mine. Santiago Sia, Whitehead on Religion: A Philosophical Basis for Inter-religious Dialogue? Presented at the conference on The Philosophical Basis for Inter-Religious Dialogue in Katowice, Poland (May 2008) and also appearing in this volume. 18 50 49 48 recognition and admission that any tradition, being the historical progression of beliefs and ideas that it is, cannot possibly be faithfully thought to have fully grasped and infallibly interpreted all the answers for all people for all times. It may in fact have. But agents of the tradition cannot be sure of this unless they substitute their present collection of beliefs and ideas for the ultimate that these beliefs and ideas purport to be about. We will begin the argument from the perspective of a religious absolutism. Let us say that “P”, the path of Roman Catholicism, for example, claims to have articulated the full truth of ultimate reality or P. Naturally, “P” is true if and only if P. Absolutists insist on the unconditional truth of “P”, and we see the justification for this provided by the alleged literal truth of its dogma. The problem for absolutists who are averse to inter-religious dialogue is that the only standard of truth for “P” is God (i.e., P), not the Catholic Church’s opinion of its own articulations of God (i.e., not “P”). Now, either (A) the Vatican thinks that it knows it has a complete knowledge of P, or (B) it is not the case that the Vatican thinks that it knows it has a complete knowledge of P. The first disjunct, A leads to either an epistemic relativism or an infinite regress of epistemic justification. The second disjunct, B leads to the humble admission of fallibilism. (Let me explain the reasoning of what A and B lead to immediately following this summary of the larger argument.) Because A is not feasible, religious absolutists are obliged to be fallibilists. As fallibilists who are nevertheless committed to P, they must arguably engage in open and receptive inter-religious dialogue with others who claim to have access to P, if they are to remain faithful to their objects of veneration. As already argued, engaging in genuine inter-religious dialogue requires that one assumes two basic pluralistic assumptions, which, in the end can only be made sense of in the context of a deep religious pluralism. Religious absolutism is therefore committed to religious pluralism. In returning to the disjunct above, we see that disjunct A, where the Vatican thinks that it knows it has a complete knowledge of P, has two possibilities. To arrive at these possibilities we must ask, how do they know that they know P? In the first case if they say that their knowledge of P is based on “P”, but if there is no external justification of their dogma (“P”), then this leads to an epistemic relativism. The supposedly unconditional truth of “P”, rather than being derived strictly from P, would be contingent on the Vatican’s conception or articulation of it. In the second case, they might say that they know that “P” is true because God has certified their knowledge that “P” is true. Indeed, they might say, God alone can certify that one has complete knowledge of P. But how do they know that God has certified that “P” is true? This conception or conviction that “P” is certified by God has two possibilities, either their knowledge that “P” is certified by God is based on “their knowledge God has certified that ‘ “P” is certified by God’ ”—but then how do they know that they know, and so on and so forth ad infinitum, or they must be fallibilists. There is no satisfactory answer for the certification of their knowledge that “P” is a complete knowledge of P, because they must constantly be appealing certification of their knowledge of P to a knowledge of their knowledge. But their knowledge claims about their knowing the mind of God has no ground aside from 19 their own insistences, which is no justification, whether religious or philosophical. To be sure, this would amount to a poor use of the concept of faith, because faith here would become an excuse for blind insistence. Therefore, any insistence on the absolutist’s part that he has the truth, even though he may very well have the truth (he just cannot know it) is not faith, rather it is a bald-faced insistence that he knows the mind of God!51 This is, of course, anathema to the Christian concept of God and something that no religious practitioner (or tradition) faithful to P (however it is conceived) can lay claim to. Since neither of A’s two possibilities are acceptable, we are left with disjunt B, where it is not the case that the Vatican thinks that it knows it has a complete knowledge of P. This, of course, means that the Vatican does not have the authority, internally or in inter-religious dialogue, to make absolute claims of “P” being the only legitimate path to P. B thus leads us to a seemingly contradictory position of a fallibilist absolutism that forces the faithful to an open and receptive inter-religious dialogue with others who purport to have access to P as well. To avoid the loss of meaning that results from disjunct A, a religious absolutist must be willing to accept a little bit of pluralistic humility. What does this humility look like and what would this mean? It means accepting the two distinctively pluralistic criteria, the positive and the negative! This, therefore, necessitates at least the temporary acceptance of religious pluralism for the faithful absolutists.52 Absolutists are constantly met with the necessity to be falliblists and therefore pluralists. If they refuse these obligations, then they are substituting their own conceptions (“P”) for Gods (P). Absolutist dogmas thus need to be reinterpreted with a religious pluralism in mind and this means that a shared vision of reality as a philosophical basis for this pluralism and the necessary ensuing dialogue needs to be found. Ratzinger writes that “[m]an cannot come to terms with being born blind, and remaining blind, where essential things are concerned.”53 If this is true, then it gives us all the more reason to seek out these truths as they exist in their various forms across the spectrum of religious traditions. Although he follows up this observation with the statement that “[t]he farewell to truth can never be final,”54 we should not be deluded into thinking that this means we can ever trust faithfully that we have full An appeal to religious experience does not solve this certification problem. This is not a question about whether one can experience or even come to know “the presence of God”, but whether one can know the mind of God. Note that this argument does not mean that a tradition’s truths cannot be universally true (i.e., true everywhere, for all time), but only that these allegedly universal truths, therefore, cannot be faithfully thought to be exhaustive of all religious truth. Therefore, it is religiously incumbent on the absolutist who wishes to be faithful to her ultimate to engage in genuine inter-religious dialogue and therefore to downgrade her religious beliefs to being universally rather than absolutely true, thereby adhering to a pluralistic account of religious diversity. Or at least, as Cobb suggests, temporarily bracket them as such. 53 52 51 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 165. Ibid. 20 54 understanding from one tradition alone, as he seems to think we do. Rather, what this seems to point us towards is the next best thing: a shared inter-religious dialogue on the religious experience involving religious leaders and practitioners, philosophers and theologians, lay persons and clergy. Any who enter this dialogue to convert others to some “absolute truth” engage not only in deception, but also offer themselves up as “an exhibition of folly.”55 While both Vatican II (relativist or not) and the absolutism of theologians like Ratzinger are firmly rooted in faith, they both seem to be philosophically unpalatable and, if the argument just made obtains, they are also theologically and philosophically untenable. This pushes us towards a middle, pluralistic path because, if one cannot be certain that one properly grasps P on one’s own, and one wants to come as close to grasping P as possible, then one must be open to genuine inter-religious dialogue and learning alleged perspectives of P from other traditions. Genuine inter-religious dialogue and religious pluralism is, therefore, dead center in the Catholic tradition. Pluralism is the only philosophical ground that can deal with religious ultimates as actual, unconditioned objects. I argue that it is also the only way a deep inter-religious dialogue can occur. Other grounds, such as absolutism, may be able to handle dialogue about beliefs and ideas that are not essential to the religious, but they will not be able to dialogue about seemingly contradictory ultimate realities. Only a deep religious pluralism can accommodate these seemingly contradictory ultimates. Therefore, it alone is able to get people to talk across traditions and learn from varying religious beliefs and ideas (including beliefs and ideas that are properly normative in their own traditions). This is because religious beliefs and ideas are typically understood vis-à-vis the religious ultimate identified in their respective traditions. Does this argument then mean that absolutists cannot engage in interreligious dialogue? To the contrary! What it calls for is the absolutist (to still be absolutist) to at least be capable of displaying the ability to temporarily imagine what it would be like to still maintain all of her tradition’s beliefs, but with the provision that they are universally true rather than exhaustive of truth. Or, as Griffin writes: “[t]he crucial point is that we hold fast to the universal validity of our own norms without insisting that these norms are the only ones with universal validity.”56 To not display at least a modicum of humility such as this with regard to one’s self-assurances (or tradition’s assurance) as to the completeness of religious and spiritual truths of one’s tradition is a mark of utter profanity. If these absolutists are committed to a conception of their religious beliefs as absolute, and their religious ultimate as an unconditional reality, then this leads them to be committed to dialogue. Therefore, they must also be committed to pluralism. Should they wish to stop anywhere along the way, they cannot do so without contradiction. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (orig. ed. 1929), Corrected edition, ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), xiv. 56 55 Griffin, Deep Religious Pluralism, 63. 21 Conclusion The pluralistic turn broadens the scope of what can or should be considered as possibly true to include what have been heretofore considered incommensurable traditions, or incommensurable truth-claims within different traditions, viewing them instead as holding potentially compossible worldviews, praxes, and soteriologies. One’s understanding (or in Ratzinger’s case, misunderstanding) of religious pluralism, however, will inevitably effect one’s view of inter-religious dialogue and thus also one’s engagement in such activity. Furthermore, one’s engagement in such activity will inevitably influence one’s understanding of the possibility (or at least the appropriateness) of there being a viable theology of religious pluralism. If one does not engage in inter-religious dialogue, has little or no contact with other traditions, or only tries to engage in polemics or evangelism one will inevitably isolate oneself from the understanding necessary to maintain and nurture the inroads to pluralism. If one does not see the pluralistic turn (much less religious pluralism) as a viable option, the point of inter-religious dialogue comes into question. But for those who do see pluralism as viable, they must understand that it is not something that will be attained via inter-religious dialogue alone. The two – inter-religious dialogue and religious pluralism – must form a hermeneutic circle wherein greater understanding and efficacy of one facilitates a greater understanding and efficacy of the other, each leading to an enriched understanding of oneself, the human condition, and the various means of diagnosing and addressing its challenges and realizing its opportunities. For the spiritual individual, this process should have no end of diminishing returns. Neither should it result in some meta-religion that consists of cherry-picked components of divergent traditions, as this would isolate unique aspects of various traditions from the lineages in which they derive meaning. Indeed, this is why we need to maintain individual traditions—because they have individually and esoterically developed rich, efficacious praxes that bring us closer to the religious ultimates (viz., creativity, God, and actual occasions). Instead of a meta-process-based religion, this interplay of dialogue and religious pluralism should yield constant and novel enrichment for its participants and for the traditions that the participants adhere to. This is not only an enrichment of one’s own spirituality, but also of one’s familiarity with religious truth. This is a truth, however, that no one tradition can reasonably claim a monopoly on, because it is a truth about the manifold challenges that face the human condition and the varied responses to the personal and impersonal ultimates in this world. There are multiple religious ultimates in a Whiteheadian deep religious pluralism, but Whitehead reminds us that the accurate expression of the final generalities [or ultimates] is the goal of discussion and not its origin…. Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tentative formulations of the ultimate 22 generalities.57 To get a better picture of how we can better orient ourselves to these ontologically and religiously significant generalities, inter-religious dialogue becomes indispensable. The only tenable ground for a philosophical basis of this dialogue lies between the untenable positions of absolutism and relativism, and it is pluralism. The benefits and aims of inter-religious dialogue and religious pluralism are thus mutually supportive; the practice can test and strengthen the theory from numerous religious traditions, while the theory, in turn, provides a philosophical basis for the practice. The metaphysical pluralism of ontological cum religious generalities thus serves as a philosophical basis for more than just deep religious pluralism, but for deep inter-religious dialogue as well. Together, the theory of deep religious pluralism and the practice of inter-religious dialogue can strengthen religious worldviews and serve to assist the faithful in the attainment of their spiritual goals. Matthew Lopresti is Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Humanities at Hawai‘i Pacific University. He has lectured in philosophy at numerous universities in the United States and served as Lecturer of Buddhist Philosophy for the Antioch Buddhist Studies Program in Bodh Gaya, India and PreDoctoral Fellow with the Department of Philosophy at West Virginia University. He has published articles and a book review in philosophy of religion, process thought, existentialism, and South Asian philosophy. His most recent being “Sanātana Dharma as a Whiteheadian Religious Pluralism?” Process Studies 36.1 (Spring/Summer 2007): 108-120 and corrigenda in Process Studies 36.2. In August 2008 he is defending his dissertation titled “Religious Pluralism in Analytic, Process, and South Asian Philosophies of Religion” with the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. 57 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 8. 23